No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-449-5-15-2

LTS- HR 6483

INFORMATION

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

April 21, 1971

TOP SECRET

State Dept. review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

WINSTON LORD

MORI C05141754

SUBJECT:

Pakistan

It turns out that Ambassador Farland's backchannel position is the same as his frontchannel position. In both cases he favors the option 3 of his frontchannel cable, i.e., the middle course between castigating and whitewashing Pakistan.

When we talked this morning you apparently thought that Farland was "officially" in favor of option 2 (siding with the Bengalis), presumably because Saunders in the staff meeting mistakenly cited this as Farland's position. I had not yet seen the backchannel and thought you meant that Farland had opted for option 1 (siding with Pakistan).

While I am always reluctant to choose the middle course between two forceful options (i.e., the famous "option 2" approach), I think in this case we have little choice. We can afford neither to alienate Pakistan nor to ignore Indian sensitivities, the nasty practices of Yahya's army, and the fact that almost all observers believe that Bangla Desh will eventually become an independent entity. Thus I think some version of option 3 is the only feasible course. It might annoy both sides, but hopefully would not cut us off from either.

WL:ms:4/21/71

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